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1.  Introduction
Agricultural  reforms  in  much  of Eastern  and  Central  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet
Union  were  implemented  under circumstances  that have  made  adjustment  difficult.
Among  these are falling domestic demand for food,  ruptured  traditional trading  links,
poor  market access,  macroeconomic  instability, and  a paucity  of funds  to  cover the
costs of adjustment.  Germany's  reunification  in  1990  placed enormous  demands  for
adjustment  on  the  agricultural  sector,  but  did  so  in  an  environment  that  removed
many of the factors  impeding adjustment  elsewhere.  The transformation  of the form-
er  German  Democratic  Republic  (GDR)  through  merger  is  unique,  and  it highlights
aspects  of the  adjustment  experience  not  seen  with  the  same  clarity  elsewhere.
Although  none  of the  other  countries  in  transition  will  face  the  particular  German
circumstances,  the experience of the agricultural sector during and after reunification
offers several important insights for other countries in transition.
This  paper attempts  to draw out these lessons.  Part one of the paper describes  the
starting  point of agriculture  in  the  east  before  and  at the  time  of reunification.  The
pressure to adjust was  stronger than  seen  in any country  of transition  or  in  any  in-
dustrialized country  at  any time  in  history.  Part two  characterizes  the  situation  five
years after  reunification  and  informs  on  where  we are  in  the  process  of transition.
Comparing  east  and  west  German  agriculture  highlights  that  the  evolution  of
agriculture  in  the  east  is  unique  worldwide.  Part  three  of  the  paper  analyses  the
determinants  of adjustment.  It  will  be  shown  that  it was  not  mainly  the  transfer  of
capital and  the subsidies which accelerated  the adjustment  process, but  likely more
so the institutional framework chosen. Policies seem  to matter the most.
The  transition  process  in  eastern  Germany  continues,  as  it  does  throughout  the
region; even under German  conditions, economic adjustment was  not instantaneous.
The  German  experience  offers  insights  that  may  be  of  use  to  policy-makers
elsewhere;  this paper presents some of them.  Part four summarizes the conclusions
and lessons to date.
2.  The Legacy:  Two Parts of Germany  and  the different starting point
Prior to  1949,  Eastern  and  Western  Germany  comprised  most  of pre-war  territory,
and  thus they were  subject to  the  same  economic  and  social  policies. According to
data  for  the  period  1935-38  labor,  productivity in the  eastern  part  of  the  country
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232exceeded that  in the west by 57%,  and  land productivity surpassed  that  in  the west
by 7.1  percent as yields for most crops and livestock were higher  in the East2. Farms
in the eastern part were somewhat  larger than  in the west,  and  tended  to  use  more
advanced technology. Thirty six percent of arable land was cultivated  by farms  of 50
ha or more  in the east as compared  to  11.1  percent in  the western  part of Germany.
The  average  farm  size  in  the  East was  10.5  ha and  in  the West  5.9  ha.  Land/man
ration in 1939 was 27 workers/100  ha in the east and 43 workers/100  ha  in the west.
Development  of agriculture  in the east was highly affected  by the socialist  policies  in
the  former  GDR.  By  1960,  more  than  90  percent  of  the  land  was  managed  in
collective  or  state  farms.  This  distribution  of  ownership  remained  essentially  the
same  until  1989,  collectivized  except  for  the  household  plots.  The  proportions  of
collective, state and private farms  in 1989 are shown  in Table  1. The average  size of
a crop farm was  1386 ha for collective farms  and 5012 ha for state  farms.  Livestock
farms  were  highly  specialized  and  had  only  31  ha  if  they  were  organized  as
collectives and no land if they were state farms.
In  contrast  to  these  developments  in  Eastern  Germany,  West  Germany's  farms
remained  private and relatively small. The average farm size increased from  8.06  ha
to  18.17 ha from  1949 to  1989, a growth of only 0.25 ha per year.
In  the  west  German  experience,  the  increase  in  farm  size  from  8  to  18  ha  was
accompanied  by  a  significant  increase  in  land  and  labor  productivity.  In  East
Germany  in  contrast, the  increase  in farm  size from  8.8  ha  to  4,538.3  ha 3  in  crop
production  brought  only  minor  productivity  increases  over  the  period.  After  forty
years  of  separate  development,  east  German  agriculture  had  lower  yields  per
hectare and per animal than in the west,  and productivity of land and  labor was lower
as well. The inefficiency of east German agriculture was certainly  not caused  by  lack
of capital.  East  German  agriculture  used  more  capital  per  unit  produced  than  west
German  agriculture,  but  it  is widely accepted  that West  Germany  used  much  more
capital  compared  to  agriculture  in  other  market  economies  with  somewhat  larger
farm sizes.
The two  Germanys  officially reunited  on  October  3,  1990.  Prior to  that,  however,  in
July 1, 1990,  East  Germany had  already immersed  its agricultural  sector in  the  new
system  of  rules  used  by  the  West.  The  restructuring  of  the  eastern  economy
occurred rapidly, introducing  sudden changes in  a  manner never experienced  by the
west  German  population.  Many  policy  makers  asserted  that  the  people  of  Eastern
Germany  would  not accept such  rapid and  profound  changes,  but in  fact they  did.
The  government  adopted  many  policies to facilitate structural  change  and  to  ease
the  social  costs,  and  the  design  of  agricultural  policy  is  a  special  case  in point.
Changes  in Eastern  Germany  during  the  past five years  have  been  no  less  than
remarkable.  Agriculture  was  one  of  the  few  sectors  which  could  even  increase
production  in  spite  of  significant  labor  shedding  (Figure  1).  In contrast,  industrial
production dropped by nearly 60 percent within two years and was in 1996 still more
than 40 percent below that in 1989 (Figure 2).
2  Weber, A. (1993),  Umgestaltung der Eigentumsverhaeltnisse  und der Produktionsstruktur  in der
Landwirtschaft der DDR. Kiel p. 68. The productivity  is measured  in grain  equivalents  per labor unit
and  per ha.
3 8.8 ha was the average  farm size in  East Germany after the land reform  in  1946.
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environment  in Eastern  Germany  in one stroke and gave rise  to a sharp adjustment
in all  sectors of the economy.  The pressure  to adjust was  heavily  affected  by  policy
decisions  which  changed  the  macroeconomic  environment.  The  first  of  these
decisions concerned the fixation of the exchange  rate. The exchange  rate  chosen  of
1 to  1 did not reflect purchasing power  parity, which would have  led  to an  exchange
rate  of 4 to  1, nor did  it  reflect the parity of real  exchange  rates,  which  would  have
led  to  an  even  greater exchange  rate.  Thus,  agricultural  prices  in  the  former  GDR
dropped overnight by  a high percentage  (Table 2). The  agricultural  sector  produced
a  negative  value  added  at  these  new  prices  in  1990  at  the  time  of  reunification
(Table  3).  In addition,  a  political decision was  made to quickly  adjust wages  in  East
Germany  to the  level  of those  in  West Germany.  Thus,  in  1991  the  unemployment
benefits  in  real  terms  in  East  Germany  were  even  higher  than  wages  before
unification. Therefore,  the agricultural  sector had to adjust to  much  lower  prices and
to higher wage rates.
However,  macroeconomic conditions were not the only negative effect on the sector.
It  was  of  utmost  importance  that  there  was  a  social  safety  net  to  absorb  the
outmigrating  labor force.  Moreover,  the stable monetary  and  institutional  framework
allowed the sector to adjust much  more  easily than was the case  in  countries where
these conditions did not prevail.
Table 3 clearly shows the pressure to adjust.  Net income  in agriculture was negative
in  1990  at prices of west German  agriculture.  Livestock production  was under  more
pressure to adjust than crop production.  Net value added of livestock production was
even negative.  This observation deserves some emphasize.  A negative value added
indicates that the country would have  been better off without  this  production  at that
point of time.  However,  the advice to  close down  all production  units which  produce
a  negative value added  would  have  been  too  hasty at  that time  as the evolution  in
agriculture  after reunification indicated.
3.  What has been  achieved?
A  similar  change  as  that  in  the  overall  economy  in  East  Germany  has  not  been
observed  in  any country.  Figure  3  and  4  highlight  what  happened.  Both  parts  of
Germany  were fairly similar  in  their production  and  employment  shares  in  1950,  at
about the time when the two Germanys  started their different  paths of development.
At  the time  of  reunification the  countries  looked quite  dissimilar, structural  change
had been  less pronounced  in the east than  in the west. Actually, the structure of the
eastern  economy in  1989 was nearly exactly that of the west in  1964, which  means
a 25 years  time  lag.  However,  the  east  economy  made  up  very  fast. Already  five
years after unification both parts of Germany looked very similar.
Generally, eastern enterprises were  less competitive than those in the west,  leading
to  production  decline and  a reduction  in employment.  However,  agriculture was  the
only  sector of those  producing  tradables that was  able  to  adjust while  maintaining
stable production and shedding a  relatively small  amount of labor (see Figures  1 and
2).
The  production  performance  of  east  German  agriculture  has  been  outstanding
compared  to that in other states  in  transition.  In other countries,  production  dropped
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serve  as  a  relevant  comparison  (see  Figure  5).  Agricultural  production  in  Ukraine
declined  by  about  40  percent  over a  five  year  period,  while  employment  declined
only marginally.
Agriculture in  Eastern  Germany  not only outperformed  agriculture  in other  transition
countries,  but  agriculture  in  Western  Germany  as  well.  In 1989,  one  year  before
unification,  agriculture  in  the  eastern  part  of Germany  employed  more  capital  and
labor per  unit of output.  Yields per  ha and  per  cow were  about  20 percent  lower  in
the  east than  in  the  west.  However,  productivity  grew  quickly  in  the  east,  and  had
already surpassed that in the west after five years.  Selected farm  indicators,  such as
workers  per  100  ha,  profit per family worker  and  assets per  unit  of  production  (see
Figures  6,  7,  and  8)  clearly  indicate  that  east  German  agriculture  became  more
efficient than that of West Germany.
4.  Political determinants  of the performance  of East German agriculture
There  is  a widely held  belief that the economic  performance  of  East  Germany  was
solely,  or at  least,  mainly,  based  on  the transfer of capital  from  the  western  part  of
Germany.  However,  it  is  likely that other factors  were  more  crucial;  moreover,  the
capital transfer from  the west  even had  some pronounced  negative  macroeconomic
effects.  The  main  determinants  of the eastern  performance  will  be  discussed  in  the
following sections.
4.1  Privatization
The  Government  of  united  Germany  set  the  rules  for  transition  from  day  one,
whereas  the  standard  for  the  privatization  of  land  had  already  been  set  before
unification  in spring  1990.  Restitution  was the general  principle. 4 All  owners  of  land
were  free  to  decide  how to  use  their  properties.  If there  were  no  approved,  valid
claims for a given piece of land,  a governmental agency (Treuhand) was  in charge  of
managing  the  property.  Some  of  this  land  was  sold,  but  most  was  rented  out.
Surprisingly, the  new private owners  largely preferred  to  lease their  land  out  rather
than  work  on  it  themselves.  Hence,  more  than  90  percent  of  arable  land  was
cultivated by tenants in East Germany  in  1995, even though more  than 80 percent of
the  land was  owned by private  owners and only about  17  percent was owned  by the
state (see Table 4).
This distinction between  ownership and  usership of the land  is crucial  to explaining
the  performance  of  east  German  agriculture.  It  is  true  that  tenants  have  more
problems  getting  credit  than  do  land  owners;  however,  experience  in  German
agriculture indicates that tenant operators tend to be more efficient than land owners
(see  Table  5).  Tenants  in  Germany  generally  have  a  better  education  than  the
average  farm  owner  and,  moreover,  they  have  decided  to  farm  not  because  of
inherited  capital but due to  of their personal  preference  and  motivation  for farming.
Hence,  it is understandable that tenants are, on  average, better farm  operators  than
land owners.
4 For more details see Koester,  U. and  Karen  Brooks,  cit. op.
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land  and  physical  assets.  Therefore,  markets  for  land  and  assets  were  quick  to
develop  in  the  early  phases  of  the  transition  period.  The  emergence  of  these
markets  was  supported  by  specific  legislation.  The  law  which  demanded  the
dissolution of all former collective and  state farms was of special  importance.  This  is
one  of the main  determinants  affecting farms  in  East  Germany  more  favorably  than
farms  in Former Soviet Union (FSU)  countries5.
The  emerging  new  farm  structure  was  partly  based  on  private  single  ownership
farms  (which  cultivated  20  percent  of  all  agricultural  land  in  1995),  on  partnership
farms (another  20  percent),  and juridical entities,  which were  either cooperatives  or
corporations.  It was crucial to the recovery of the farm  sector that the former socialist
farms were  replaced by new entities which were either based on operator ownership
or  on  a  strict  separation  between  the  interests  of capital  owners  and  workers.  All
these  new farms  were  significantly smaller  in  size than  they  had  formerly  been  as
collective or state farms.  The single-owner full-time farms cultivated  about  156 ha on
average  in  1995,  while  partnership  farms  had  an  average  size  of  406  ha,
cooperative farms 1430 ha and corporate farms  1344 ha.
The  greater  farm  size  in  the  East  than  in  the  West  has  contributed  to  the  fast
increase  in  competitiveness  of farms  in  East Germany.  Table  6  clearly  shows  that
that  there  is  a  strong  relation  between  farm  size  and  farm  performance,  at  least
within  the  range of farm  sizes  in West  Germany  (seeTable 6  in  annex).  Of course,
there  is no clear increasing function between farm  size and  farm  performance.  Total
production  costs  can  be  decomposed  into  transformation  costs  and  transaction
costs. Transformation  costs  are the traditional  neo-classical  production  costs which
arise with  transforming  products in form,  time and space. The second  term  indicates
those  costs  which  arise  with  exchange  of  products  and  services.  The  first  cost
element  declines with size in a wide range and the second  term  normally  increases
with farm  sizes above a family farm  size. It can be  assumed that these cost functions
differ from  farm  to farm  due  to  differences  in technology,  but  also  to  differences  in
the  capability of the  management.  Hence,  it  is  not  possibly to  determine  a  general
optimal  farm  size.  The  experience  in  East  Germany  reveals  that  many  managers
who  operated  farms  far  larger  than  in  the  West  still  expected  that  the  decline  in
transformation costs would offset the  increase  in transaction costs with  increases  in
farm  size. Table  4  above shows that  single owner  and  partnership farms  extended
their farm  size from year to year, whilst the size of corporate  farms shrank over time.
However,  the  growth  in  farm  sizes  in  the  East  was  much  larger  than  in  West
Germany.  Changes in  the organizational form  of farms  has contributed to  the rapid
increase in farm efficiency.
It is widely accepted that the  inefficiency in agriculture  in former  socialist countries
was not only due to the planning system with  all its inefficiencies, it was also caused
by oversized  farms  and  the  structure  of farm  ownership.  For  instance,  transaction
costs  in  non-family  farms  are  likely to  be  a  significant determinant  of these  farms'
production  costs.  Transaction  costs,  which  include  the  costs  for  monitoring  and
enforcing  labor contracts,  depend  on  many  things, such  as the  number  of workers
employed on  a farm,  the production  pattern of the farm,  the incentives  for managers
5 Concerning  the relevance  of the organizational  form  of farms for the development  of agricultural
production  in  Ukraine see Koester, U.  and S.  von Cramon-Taubadel,  1996.
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breaching  their  contracts,  and  the  workers'  opportunity  costs  of  not  shirking.  It is
well-known  that farm  transaction costs were  high on  state  and  collective  farms;  low
labor  productivity  was  a  clear  indicator  of this.  Moreover,  theft  -- a  special  way  to
breach one's labor contract -- was a  generally acknowledged phenomenon,  even  if it
was  not officially  recorded.  The  German  experience  indicates  that  labor  discipline,
which  is negatively related  to  labor shirking,  may  improve  quickly  if farm  managers
have  an  increased  incentive  to  monitor  and  enforce  labor  contracts.  Such  an
incentive system will emerge if farm managers  are either owners of their farms  or are
paid  in  relation  to  profit  generated.  If farm  managers  are  instead  elected  by  their
workers,  as  is  the  case  in  the  newly  created  collective farms  of  the former  Soviet
Union  (FSU),  they are  likely to  be  less  inclined to  enforce  labor contracts,  since  by
being soft  on their workers they may enhance  their chances of reelection.  Hence,  it
should  be  no  surprise  that  labor  discipline  has  deteriorated  on  the  large  new
collective farms of the FSU.
The form of privatization of agriculture  chosen in  East  Germany was  also crucial  for
capitalization  of  the  sector.  There  was  an  inflow  of  private  capital  from  West
Germany,  as some farm managers in the west moved to the east to start  larger farms
or  to  get  involved  in  partnerships.  Private  capital  would  not  have  been  attracted  if
land  markets  had  not  been  liberalized.  Moreover,  the  inflow  of private  capital  was
accompanied  by an increase of know-how  available in the sector. The experience  of
East  Germany  proves  that  the  import  of  know-how was  instrumental  for  the  rapid
improvement  in  efficiency.  Actually,  it  is  hard  to  differentiate  between  those
improvements  stemming  from  pure  capital  and  those  from  pure  know-how.
Significant  increases  in  efficiency resulted from  reorganization  of the farms,  use  of
better feeding ratios, better seed and better use of other inputs.  Exploitation  of these
efficiency gains did not primarily depend on capital investment, but on know-how.
Improvement  in human  capital  could  lead to  high  efficiency gains  in  East  Germany
because the economy was opened  up at the very beginning of the transition  period.
Hence,  it was  possible to  build the  reorganization  of the  agricultural  sector  on  the
basis of  imported  technology. Again,  a  comparison  with  FSU  countries  reveals the
relevance  of this  point.  These  countries  had  not  had  many  contacts  (trading  and
otherwise)  to  market  economies before  transition, and  most  have  yet to  completely
open  up  their  economies.  This  macroeconomic  environment  has  stimulated  more
capital flight than investment,  in  both material  and  human  forms.  Therefore,  a  main
source of recovery for these economies remains to be exploited.
4.2 Price liberalization
East  Germany  benefited  from  the  macroeconomic  environment  of  the  united
Germany, which entailed a very low rate of inflation. Hence, money was accepted as
a medium  of exchange from the very beginning. A similar favorable  macroeconomic
framework  has  yet  to  come  about  in  the  FSU  countries.  Moreover,  the  German
government  never  put any restrictions  on  the use  of money,  either  as cash  or with
banking  deposit  accounts.  In  contrast,  in  the  FSU  countries  state  and  collective
farms  as  well  as  the  new  collective  farms  have  accepted  payments  for  products
delivered  to  state  enterprises  in  the  form  of  bank  deposits,  but  this  money  was
restricted  in  its use:  it could only be used after approval  by government  officials,  and
the  government  was  able  to  directly  withdraw  money  from  the  accounts  if,  for
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types  of  money  in  these  countries,  limiting  the  use  of  money  and  leading  to
segmented  product  markets  --  one  for  cash  payment  and  the  other  for  payment
through  bank  accounts.  The  consequences  were:  High  transaction  costs  for
enterprises,  reduced  division  of  labor  in  the  economy,  and  declining  overall
efficiency.
The  German  experience  indicates the  importance  of price formation  in  restructuring
an  economy.  During  the time  of planning,  prices  were  formed  from  the  bottom  up.
Planners  decided  what  to  produce,  and  prices  were  based  on  production  costs.
Consumers  had no direct effect on  price formation.  Such an  economy may be  called
supply-constrained.  In  contrast,  prices  in a  market  economy  should  be formed  from
the top  down.  A  national  economy  which  wants  to  exploit  its  own  resources  to  the
maximum  possible  extent allows domestic  prices for tradables  to be  equal  to  import
or  export  prices.  Prices  are  considered  to  be  exogenous  for  domestic enterprises.
Consequently,  domestic  producers  have  to decide  whether  the  given  prices  cover
production costs for the set of commodities  they produce.  If costs are not covered  for
some products,  producers  have to change the composition of their production.  Such
an economy  is demand-driven.
As  prices were set exogenously for farmers (as was the case for other producers  in
East  Germany),  the  economy  quickly  moved  from  being  supply-constrained  to
demand-driven.  Therefore, farms  had to  change the composition  of their production
correspondingly  quickly.  In  particular,  the  changes  in  the  composition  of  regional
production  contributed  to the overall  increase in  the efficiency  of the farm sector.  In
former  times,  farms  were  supposed  to  fulfill  the  national  plan  which  prescribed
regional self-sufficiency for individual products as much as possible. Because  of this,
regional  specialization  in  agriculture  could  not  reflect  regional  comparative
advantages.  Hence,  there was significant potential to change the production  pattern.
Specialization  in potato  production  is a special case  in  point.  Farms  produced  a  lot
of potatoes  during  the  planning  period  because  they were  needed  for  human  and
animal  consumption.  The  change  to  an  open  economy  and  the  demolition  of
restrictions for  imported  feed,  meant  that there  was  less  demand  for  potatoes  for
feed.  Therefore,  potato  production  declined  sharply,  but  to  differing  degrees  for
individual  regions,  depending  on  a  region's  comparative  advantage  for  potato
production.
The  process  of  price  liberalization  has  been  different  in  FSU  countries,  and  has
given rise to fewer gains  in efficiency. It may take  some time to develop functioning
markets,  but the  main  drawback has  been that  manifold  governmental  interference
has distorted  price formation up to  1996 (although this has been less distorting over
time).  Domestic  markets have  been segmented  through delivery quotas,  regulations
concerning book and cash money and special regulations for price formation.  Even if
prices have  officially been set free, and  if buyers  and  sellers have been  allowed to
"negotiate" prices or  deliver on  the  basis of contracts, the  basis for price  formation
for  most  agricultural  production  has  been  cost-plus  pricing,  without  taking  border
prices into consideration.  Cost-plus pricing was  even more prevalent in the prices of
monopolies, which contributed a high share of market volume  in most  FSU  countries.
Monetary  instability  and  governmental  market  interference  made  it  impossible  to
base  production  decisions  on  realistic  expected  prices.  Due  to  the  lag  between
production  decisions  and  market  delivery  in  agriculture,  prices  failed  to  guide
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production pattern in  FSU  countries changed much less than it did  in  East Germany.
It  is  often  claimed  that  price formation  in the  state  marketing  channel  (which  is  the
most distorted)  gets less  important over time  as a higher percentage  of products  are
sold  on the free  market.  However,  it has  to be  acknowledged  that  prices  formed  on
these  markets  are  affected  by  trade  regulations  and  price  formation  in the  state's
marketing  channel.6  Prices  on  these  markets  are  not related  to  border  prices  and,
hence,  are not good  indicators for pushing the sector from  being  supply-constrained
to being demand-driven.
4.3 Financial  state support of the agricultural sector
It is true that there were huge  public financial transfers from West to East  Germany,
and one  might believe that the outstanding  performance  of east German  agriculture
was  mainly the  result  of this support.  Agriculture  in  the  east  received  subsidies  in
different  forms,  above  and  beyond  those  paid  to  west  German  farmers  who  have
benefited from the Common Agricultural  Policy of the EU since 1967.
First,  it should  be  noted that east German  agriculture  was exposed  to  a  price  shock
that was much  more  pronounced than that in other countries in  transition  (see Table
2).  There  is no  other region where  prices were  changed so significantly  and  in  one
stroke. Table  3  reveals that  east German  agriculture was  not economically  viable  at
the  new  set  of prices without  a  significant adjustment.  Hence,  it  is  understandable
that the German  government  decided to  launch a  program  in  1990 -- the time of the
price break -- to restore the liquidity of farms.  Payments per farm were  in accordance
to people employed.  In addition,  there were  specific capital  subsidization  programs.
Those who  wanted  to  start family farms,  employing one  and  a  half people  full-time,
could receive a net transfer of up to 80000 DM  over the life-span  of their investments
(normally  20 years).  Even  large farms  could  receive huge  subsidies for  investment.
There  is no doubt that these subsidies eased the adjustment of the sector. However,
these subsidies  mainly affected  the  composition  of inputs,  i.e.  substituted  labor for
capital  and  were  unlikely  to  have  contributed  significantly  to  the  increase  in
efficiency.  Figure  9  to  12  shows  that  yields  increased  quickly  in  East  Germany,
which contributed  to the improvement  in efficiency. However, increases  in yields are
likely  to  be  less  dependent  on  capital  subsidization  than  they  are  on  functioning
markets  and managers'  know-how.
At  any rate,  the  effects of capital  subsidization  in  East Germany  were,  most  likely,
much  less  positive  from  the  macroeconomic  point  of  view  than  from  that  of  the
farmers  who  received  benefits.  Firstly,  unemployment  in East  Germany  was  high,
and  there  had  been  a  lot  of  shedding  of  labor  from  farms;  in  fact,  this  was
augmented  by  capital  subsidization.  For  example,  one  survey  found  that  three
quarters  of  existing  cow  stables  could  have  been  made  usable  after  some
restoration,  but the  subsidization of capital  made  the  building  of new  stables  more
economic from  the  individual  point  of  view.  The  consequence  of  this  was  higher
unemployment.
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6  cit. op.  p.Secondly, farms only received  capital  subsidies if they submitted  'farm  improvement
plans'  indicating  that  the  planned  investment  was  reasonable.  However,  recent
research work  in west Germany  has shown  that 'farm  improvement  plans'  are  of no
help  in  selecting  profitable  investment  projects7 ,  i.e.  the  correlation  between  the
income  per worker predicted  in  the  'farm  improvement  plan'  and  the  actual  income
was  only  0.24.  About  half  of  all  farms  that  received  investment  aids  generated  a
negative  imputed  interest  rate  on  their  own  capital,  even  after  having  taken
advantage of the subsidized capital.
The  experience  with  capital  subsidization  of  farm  investment  in  West  Germany
supports the expectation that a high share of subsidized investment  in  East Germany
was  not profitable from  either the economic or the financial  point of  view.  Hence,  it
should  be  no  surprise  that  reports  in  1996  revealed  that  one  third  of  the  newly
created farms  in  East  Germany  had  serious financial  problems.  According  to Table
7,  38 percent of single owner farms  had a profit of only 20 000 DM  per working  unit.
That is certainly not enough for a viable farm.
5.  Critical issues in transforming the agricultural sector
5.1  Exchange  rate fixation and wage  rate  policy
The  transformation  of  agriculture  in  East  Germany  was  highly  affected  by  two
governmental  decisions: the  fixation  of the  exchange  rate  and  the  setting  of wage
rates.  The  decision to  accept an  exchange rate  of one to  one  between  the  Eastern
and the Western Mark was mainly political. It  is true that the purchasing  parity  of the
two  currencies  before  unification  was  about  1:18,  but  the  exchange  rate  does  not
reflect the purchasing power of the currencies;  rather, it has to equalize  the prices  of
tradables.  According  to  Sinn  and  Sinn  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  should  have
been  near  5:1,  i.e.  5  Eastern  Marks  (M)  for  1  Western  Mark  (DM).  By  setting  the
exchange  rate  at  1:1,  sectors  producing  tradables  came  under  strong  pressure  to
adjust.  Actually,  some enterprises,  such as  the automobile  industry,  became  highly
unprofitable overnight. The agricultural  sector, which produces tradables, was one of
those  sectors  under  strong  pressure  to  adjust.  No  other  transition  country  exerted
such an extraordinarily strong pressure on sectors producing tradables.
Sectors  under pressure to  adjust have  a higher chance of succeeding and surviving
if factor  prices  are  downwardly  flexible.  However,  these  sectors  in  East  Germany
were  unable  to  benefit  from  such  a  situation;  in  fact,  the  opposite  was  the  case.
Income  per male worker in east  German  agriculture was M 722  per month  in  1988.
After  unification, wages  outside agriculture  increased  immediately  to  40  percent  of
the  level  in  West  Germany  (DM  1380),  and  increased  to  about  DM  2333  in  June
1995.  Immediately after unification, unemployment benefits and pensions were about
as high as wages earned  in agriculture  before  unification.  Hence, there was  strong
pressure  for  farms  to  lay off  workers,  and  workers  were  pulled  out  of  the  sector,
either  by  employment  opportunities  outside  agriculture  or  by  social  security
programs.
7 Striewe,  L. J.-P. Loy and  U. Koester, 1996.
8 Compare Sinn,  G.  and H.-W.Sinn  (1993),  Kaltstart - Volkswirtschaftliche  Aspekte der deutschen
Vereinigung.  p.  65.
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exchange rate of  1:1  and by the decision of the German government  to adjust wages
in the  east quickly to the  level  of those  in the west.  Had  wages  in  the east  instead
remained  at  the  purchasing  power  level  of  1989,  which  was  thirty  percent  of  the
western  level,  employment  in agriculture would  have been  much  higher.  Adjustment
was  partly  eased  through  investment  subsidies,  but  was  also  enforced  by  these
subsidies.
The determinants  of the adjustment  pressure can  be analyzed  with  the  help  of  the
following  figures.  Figures  13  and  14  present  the  initial  situation  of  agricultural
product and factor markets as  compared to that after the introduction  of new  product
and factor prices following  unification.
In the  initial  situation,  prices for  livestock products were  more  favorable  than  those
for  crop  products  as  compared  to  western  countries.  As  prices  were  based  on
production costs,  efficiency  in  livestock production  was  much  less than  that  in  crop
production.  Such  a  situation  prevailed  in  all  socialist  countries.  With  the  given
production  possibility  curve  P0  and  the  pre-unification  product  price  ratio  rA'  east
German  agriculture  produced  at  point  A'  in  Figure  13.  Unification  changed  the
product  price  ratio  to  rB,  . Had  the  production  possibility remained  unchanged,  the
new  optimal  output  mix  would  have  been  at  B'.  However,  unification  changed  the
economic  environment  on  the  farms:  the  reorganization  of  the  farms  reduced
transaction  costs,  allowing  greater  production  with  the  given  factor  endowment.
Thus,  the  production  possibility moved from  P0  to  P1 ,  an  indication  that A'  was  an
inefficient  production point.  The new optimal  point became  C';  hence,  the pattern  of
production  had  to  change  from  A'  to  C'.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  change  in  the
production  mix  was  not  only  induced  by the  change  in  the  product  price  ratio,  but
also by the increase in efficiency on the farms.
Pressure  to change was even more  pronounced on factor markets.  Figure  14  depicts
the  situation.  The  initial  situation  is  characterized  by the  isoquant  Q0  and  the  iso-
cost  curve  f0; the  optimal  factor  mix  is  given  at  point  A.  The  slope  of  the  iso-cost
curve  changed with  unification because  labor costs went  up  significantly, leading  to
the  new  optimal  point  B. However,  further adjustment  was  needed  because  of  the
highly subsidized use of capital,  leading to the iso-cost curve fD  and the new  optimal
point  C,  which  indicates  less  use  of  labor  than  at  point  B.  A  further  push  for
adjustment  resulted from  a  shift  in  the  isoquant  curves.  Reduced  transaction  costs
on the farms allowed the production  of the same quantity  Qo with a  smaller  input  mix
after unification than before. Hence, the new optimal  point was at point D. The extent
of the adjustment needed is visible from  the data presented  in Table  2. Value added
at new product prices was negative. Hence, the value of products at the initial output
mix A' was  lower than the factor costs at the initial input mix given at point A.
It has to  be  noted  that this situation  was  mainly policy-induced and  only typical for
East Germany. Agriculture  in other transition countries would have been  exposed to
less pressure to  adjust, even if markets had been liberalized in one stroke as in East
Germany.  First,  the  deterioration  in  the  sectoral  terms  of trade  would  have  been
considerably  less,  as  the  change  in  the  exchange  rate  would  have  been  more
moderate.  Second,  wage  rates  outside  the  agricultural  sector  would  have  gone  up
much  less than was the case  in  East  Germany. At any  rate,  the German  experience
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incentives are set into place.
5.2 Valuation  and  distribution of assets
The  privatization  of  non-land  assets  of  the  farms  proceeded  separately  from
distribution of the land. The first Agricultural Adjustment Act  specified that the assets
should  be divided among three  parties:  those who  brought assets  into the collective
at  the  time  they  joined  (former  owners),  land  owners  (those who  had  a  claim  for
restitution)  and  workers.  The  law  also  provided  rules  for  valuing  the  assets.  All
agricultural  enterprises  had to  set up an  opening balance-sheet, where  assets were
valued at prevailing market prices rather than at their book values. Former owners  of
assets  had  the  first  right  to  compensation.  Land  owners  had  a  claim  to  rental
payments  for the  period  of time  the  collective  had  used  their  land.  Those  who  had
brought  into  the  collective  assets  other  than  land  (machinery,  buildings,  and
livestock)  also  had  a  claim  for  payments  on  the  principal  and  interest  forgone.  In
addition,  members  of the  collective who  had  no  legal  claim  to assets  could  receive
parts of the collective's assets.  The distribution of shares for workers  and those who
were  entitled to  land rent and  interest forgone were only considered  if the total  value
of farm  assets exceeded the value of assets brought in  by the former private farmers.
The  Act  left  the  question  of division  of  residual  assets  up  to  the  assembly  of  the
collective farms.  The divergent interests of the  parties  involved  made  an acceptable
agreement  difficult  to  reach.  The  former  owners  of  parts  of  the  assets  (land  and
machinery,  etc.) wanted  high compensation for their capital,  and the workers  wanted
high  compensation for their labor input.  Former owners  who received  compensation
regularly withdrew their capital from the enterprise at the expense  of the enterprise's
liquidity. Workers tended to  keep their shares  in the enterprise  with  the expectation
that this would  secure their job.  Each  member  of the  assembly -- which  included  the
former  members  of the  collective and  those who  were  not members  but had  claims
for land or other assets -- had one vote, regardless of whether he/she had worked  on
the  farm  or  had  brought  in  land  and  assets.  Since  most  of  the  members  in  the
assembly  had  not  brought  in  land  and  assets,  they  tended  to  overrule  the  former
owners.  Decisions differed  among enterprises,  but,  in  general, the assemblies voted
for a fifty-fifty split between  the workers and the former owners9 .
The first amendment to the Agricultural Act  (enacted July 7,  1991)  clarified the voting
rule and the distribution of assets among claimants.  In cases where wealth  had to be
distributed, the former owners of land and non-land assets were  remunerated first at
fixed  minimum  rates.  Half  of  the  remaining  value  was  distributed  to  workers,
according to  their working  time  rather than  their  income  earned  on  the  farm.  The
other half stayed with the farm  and was supposed to be part of the provisions of the
enterprise.  The  amendment  of the  law  also favored  the former  owners  by  allowing
them a block majority vote in cases where members of a collective wanted to change
the status of the farm or its subdivision. The  law also gave each member the right to
leave  the  collective farm  at  will,  requiring  only proper  notice -- one  month  for  the
year  1990 and three months for the years  1991  and  1992.  In addition,  the  collective
farm  could  dismiss  workers  when  layoffs  were  needed  or  when  workers  did  not
9  Mittelbach,  H. (1995),  Zur Lage der Landwirtschaft in  den  neuen  Bundesiandern.  Aus Politik  und
Zeitgeschichte.  Beilage  zur Wochenzeitung  das Parlament. B 33-34/95,  p.  15.
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laid off.
The  law also clarified  the  conditions  for  settling  the  claims  of  departing  members,
which  were  divided  into  two  groups.  The  first group  consisted  of  former  members
who wanted to  set up private farms.  They  received the value  of the assets  they had
brought  into  the  collective  within  one  month  of  leaving  the  farm.  Additional
remuneration  of assets and  land took  place after the approval  of the  annual  closing
balance  by the assembly of the collective farm.  The second group  -- those who gave
up  their  membership  because  they had  never worked  on  the  farm  or  had  given  up
working on the farm -- were to be paid only after the approval  of the closing  balance.
To  those  not  starting  private  farms,  the  collective  could  offer  payment  in  equal
installment  payments  over  a  five  year  period  if  a  lump  sum  payment  would  have
jeopardized  the  liquidity  of  the  enterprise.  In  reality,  many  departing  members
agreed  to  receive  a  smaller  share than  specified  by the  law.  The  managers  of  the
farms  tried to convince members  that the viability of the enterprise  and job  security
were  at stake and offered  modified  packages.  These were:  immediate  payment,  but
only  at  70  percent  of the face  value;  50  percent  in five  yearly  installments;  or  100
percent over a  10 year period.  The second  and third alternatives were offered  with  a
zero interest rate.
The  survival  of many  of the  enterprises  which  succeeded  the  collectives  was  only
possible  because  many  members  accepted  a  share  which  was  smaller  than  that
foreseen  by  the  law.  Two  hypotheses  are  offered  for explanation  of  this  behavior.
First,  members  who  had worked  on  the  collective farm  and  lived  in  the  community
were possibly interested  in securing jobs on the farm,  even  if they no  longer directly
benefited  from  the  farm.  Second,  members  may  have  realized  that  an  individual
might be better off asking for immediate payment,  but only if the enterprise  continued
to  function.  If  too  many  of  the  members  had  asked  for  immediate  payment,  the
enterprise  might  have  been  liquidated.  As  the  liquidation  value  was  normally  much
lower  than  the assessed  value  for calculating  the shares,  a member  could  actually
have  been  better  off  securing  the  continuation  of  the  enterprise  by  accepting
discounted and delayed payments of their sharel0
The managers of the collective farms generally  sought to  retain assets and continue
the  operation  of  the  farm.  They  had  much  better  information  about  the  farm's
individual  assets  than  did  most  ordinary  members.  Managers  reported  often
undervalued assets  in order to maximize the value of retained  assets, and hence the
shares of remaining  members.  In some cases, managers  did not account for all their
farms'  assets. For example, machinery left  in a field might have  been excluded from
inventory.  In  other  cases,  managers  overestimated  their  farms'  financial
commitments  and thus reduced  the total value of their assets. Managers  were able
to  undervalue  assets  primarily because  individual members  did  not have access  to
the  details  of  the  balance-sheet  of  the  farm's  assets.  More  transparency  in the
valuation process  and  external  supervision  would have  assured  greater fairness  in
the distribution.
10  Becker,  T. and  H.  Thiele  (1994),  The Transformation  of the Agricultural  Sector: The  Experience  of
East Germany.  Paper presented  in the selected  per  presentedin ther  session  of the Annual Meeting  of the American
Agricultural  Association  (AAEA)  in  San  Diego,  Cal.  USA,  Oct.10,  1994.
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discretion,  and  this  contributed  to  lack of equity,  too.  Members  departing  from  the
collective  did  not always  know their  rights.  They were  occasionally  offered  extreme
alternatives,  such  as leaving their  shares  in the enterprise  and  thereby  saving  their
workplace,  or  else  losing  their  workplace  and  accepting  either  highly  discounted
cash payments  or very unreliable installment payments.
The  practice  of  undervaluing  assets  had  both  an  allocative  and  a  distributional
effect.  Most importantly,  it prolonged  the  life of the  relatively  large  farm enterprises
by reducing  the size of the shares  shed  during the  exit  process.  It is  not clear  that
the  units created  will  remain  in  their  current  sizes and  corporate  organization,  but
they emerged  from the first round  larger than would have been the case  under  more
equitable  valuation of the shares  of departing  members.  It also  explains,  to  a  large
extent,  why  these  enterprises  tend  to  employ  more  workers  per  100  ha  than  do
partnership  farms  of  similar  size.  The  asset valuation  also  transferred  wealth  from
departing to remaining members,  many of whom were the original managers.
In  the  German  case,  the  social  impact  of the  redistribution  of  wealth  was  largely
muted  by  complementary  payments  for  the  unemployed,  retraining  programs,  and
the reduction in the pension age to support older agricultural workers.  Therefore,  the
redistribution  did not create problems of rural poverty.  No  other country  in  transition
has the resources  to offer a  rural social safety net as comprehensive  or as generous
as  that  of  Germany,  and  similar  problems  of  undervaluation  of  assets  upon  exit
would  in other settings be likely to generate severe rural poverty and hardship.
5.3 Creation  of family farms
Family farms are the dominant farms in west German  agriculture.  Hence, there was a
widely held belief among west German  politicians that a similar farm  structure would
emerge  in  the  east.  Actually,  the  creation  of family farms  was  highly  supported  by
special programs.  However, the experience defied expectations.  In  spite of the wide
distribution  of  land  amongst  former  owners,  relatively  few  of  these  "new"  owners
wanted to start farming.  Most preferred  to sell their land or to lease  it out. It seems to
be difficult to transform socialist agriculture into a farming sector with  land owners  as
operators.  The  German  experience  indicates  that  former  collective  farms  have
survived  much  longer than  expected  and  many  of them  manage  to  improve  their
efficiency  considerably.  However,  the  German  experience  also  clarifies  that  a
significant restructuring of the sector is needed. The former collective farms  seemed
to  be  too  large  and  adjusted  their size  downwards.  Moreover,  the  change  in  farm
structure is a continuous process which demands a flexible land market.
6. Concluding remarks
The  uniqueness  of the  German  experience  suggests  several  observations  relevant
to other countries in  transition.
The  socialist experiment  distorted German  agricultural development.  East
German  agricultural productivity  was  lower  than in  the west  at reunification.
The  two  parts  of  Germany  followed  different  paths  of  development  after
World War II.  The  dominant  forms  of  organization  in  the  east  were  4,500  ha
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on  purchased  feed.  In  contrast,  West  German  agriculture  was  based  on  privately
owned farms  that  increased in size over the period to approximately  18  ha  including
part-time  farms  and  to  26.1  ha  for  full-time  farms  immediately  prior  to  unification.
Economies  of scale on  the large farms  and complexes  in  the east were  expected  to
yield  lower  costs,  but  this  was,  in  fact,  not  the  case.  At  unification,  costs  of
production  were  higher  in  East  Germany  than  in  West  Germany,  and,  in  the  latter,
costs  were  higher  than  in  many market  economies with  lower  levels  of  agricultural
support.  The economic costs of the socialist experiment  in  German  agriculture  were
quite  high.
Under the particular German  conditions, structural change in agriculture was
remarkably rapid and productivity  in the East increased to surpass that in the
west in five years. Sectors producing tradable goods faced  the greatest adjustment
during  the transition.  The German  case indicates that agriculture  can  adjust  rapidly
when  the  economic  signals  are  unequivocal,  and  when  economic  agents  have
incentives  and  opportunities  to  respond.  Output  in  the  industrial  sector  fell  by  60
percent within two years and partially recovered in  1995 to less than  50 percent  of its
1989  volume.  In  contrast,  agricultural  production  in  the  east  declined  only
marginally,  and by 1994 exceeded  1989 output despite the withdrawal  of  12 percent
of arable land under set-aside programs  of the  European  Union.  Agriculture  in  East
Germany  has thus  been  a  rapidly adjusting  sector,  in  contrast  to  the experience  in
much of the CIS.
Agriculture's adjustment  consisted of  changes  in  farm  structure,  asset
ownership, technology  of production, and composition of output. The  size  of
the farms  changed  significantly.  New farmers  or partners from  the west established
farms  considerably larger than  those  in  the west  but much  smaller than  the  former
collective and  state farms.  The average size of a full-time,  single-operator  farm  was
157 ha in 1993/94 and had increased over the five year time span after reunification.
Partnership  farms  are  even  larger,  averaging  436  ha  in  1993/94,  and  are  also
growing  in  size.  Although  most  land  in  the  east  is  privately  owned  (about  85%  in
1995), few farms  are operated by the owners  of their land.  Ninety percent of the land
under  cultivation  is  leased,  either from  the  state  or from  private  owners.  Individual
operators  farm about 20 percent of arable land, but own  only part  of it.  Cooperatives
and other successors of the collective and state farms operate 60 percent of the land
(1994 data).  Unlike the cooperatives  and shareholding farms  of the CIS, these farms
differ greatly  from  their  predecessors.  The  average farm  size  in  1993/94  was  1730
ha, which is only about one third of the former average size. These farms have been
significantly reorganized, have  reduced or eliminated their nonagricultural activities,
invested  in  new  technologies,  and  drastically  reduced  employment  to  a  labor
intensity less than that on average in the west.
The  composition  of  agricultural  production  changed  significantly.  Livestock
production  declined whereas  crop production  increased.  The  change  in  commodity
composition of output in favor of the crop sector has  been  observed  throughout the
region,  and  is variously attributed  to the greater profitability of crops under the new
relative  prices  and  a  scarcity  of  capital  for  investment  in  livestock,  barns  and
equipment  in  the  livestock  industry.  In  East  Germany,  where  capital  inflows  from
western  partners  and  capital  subsidies  through  government  programs  have  been
substantial  but  partly constrained  per farm  and per farm  worker, the crop  sector has
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that shifts  in  production  patterns  observed  throughout the  region  reflect  the  higher
inefficiency in livestock production  under the command system,  but are  also affected
by the form  of subsidization and the higher capital  stock needed  to start  a  livestock
farm than a crop farm.
Although  cooperatives  have  survived  to  date,  their  future  viability  is  uncertain.
Cooperatives  pay  low  rents for  the  land  they farm,  largely  due  to  imperfections  in
land  markets  and  incomplete  information  on  the  part  of  landowners.  Moreover,
juridical  entities  benefited  disproportionately  from  changes  in  the  Common
Agricultural  Policy which introduced huge  payments  for  land taken  out  of production
and  for  the  reduction  of  prices  for  grains,  oilseeds,  and  beef.  Despite  these
advantages,  most cooperative farms  had persistent losses, due  in part  to great  labor
intensity  and  concentration  in  livestock  production.  Although  the  future  of
cooperatives  is  uncertain, their continued  presence slowed the exit of  labor from the
sector,  and  had  a  mitigating  impact  on  rural  unemployment  and  the  decline  of
livestock production.
Despite  government  programs  that  explicitly encouraged  private  family
farming, they  did not emerge  as  the  dominant form  of enterprise in  eastern
Germany.  Most  of the  former  (and  therefore  "new")  land  owners  had  a  non-farm
occupation.  They  may have  considered the size of their  new  land  too  small  to  start
farming,  they  may  have  not  had  the  know-how  to  do  it, or  they  may  have  merely
preferred to remain  in their non-agricultural occupation.
An  open  trading regime  and  a  strong, stable  currency  contributed  to  the
importation of new technologies of production and a rapid rise in yields.  The
east  German  agricultural  sector  benefited  from  the opening  up  of the  economy  by
importing  new  technologies.  Imports  of  inputs,  such  as  feed  and  technical
equipment,  led  to  rapid gains  in  yields from  1989 to  1994:  28 percent  for grain,  37
percent for sugar beets and 26 percent for milk.
Lease,  rather than sale of land, dominated the activity on East  German  land
markets. Leasing provided needed flexibility  for adjustments in farm size,  as
well as  lower start-up costs for new  farms.  Moreover,  leasing served as  a
selection  criteria  for  qualified  management.  The  Treuhand-Company  was
cautious  in  decisions  on  divestiture  of  land,  and  thus  contributed  to  the  high
proportion of leased  land  in eastern Germany.  Treuhand leased  some  land  out even
after  it became  clear that  no  claims were  likely. This caution was  again  reflected  in
the  preference  for  short-term  leases  instead  of  longer  contracts.  Treuhand's
reluctance  to  sell  agricultural  land  may  have  reduced  investment  in the  sector.
Leasing  was  common,  however,  even  among  private  owners  and  operators,  and
well-functioning  lease  markets  were  critical  to  the  adjustment  of  resource  use  in
agriculture.  In the German  experience,  therefore, freely functioning land  markets  led
to relatively little sale,  but active leasing.
Employment in  agriculture declined by about 80%  in  the  five years  since
unification, and the exodus  of labor continues. The fact that this outflow  of labor
was possible with  little or no decline  in output underscores  the high  labor-intensity  of
agriculture  during  the  socialist  era.  The  magnitude  of  the  exodus  reflects  the
integration  of  labor  markets  in  eastern  and  western  Germany  that  came  with
246unification.  Wages  in  the  east  rose  rapidly  to  approach  those  of  the  west,  and  at
these  high  wage  rates,  east  German  farms  could  not  retain  the  large  labor  forces
they inherited from  the  collectivist era.  Without unification, wages  would  have  risen
much  more slowly,  if at all, and the outflow of labor from  agriculture would  have  been
more  moderate.  The  east  German  experience  is  an  extreme  case  of the  impact  of
higher  real  wages  elsewhere  on  agricultural  employment.  Other  countries  in  the
region  have experienced  less outflow  of labor,  and,  in  some  cases,  agriculture  has
absorbed labor displaced by civil unrest or industrial restructuring.
Capital subsidies built into the programs of support during the transition  exacerbated
the  outflow  of  labor  in  East  Germany.  Changes  in  the  pension  programs  and  in
social assistance  payments  also facilitated the  outflow  of  labor.  Establishment  of  a
comprehensive  rural  safety  net  was  essential  in  Germany.  Without  it,  the
combination  of  high wages  and  capital  subsidies  would  have  brought  widespread
rural  poverty as farms released redundant workers.
Germany's  decline in agricultural  labor may appear to  be  anomalous.  For example,
few  countries  elsewhere  in  the  region  can  consider  programs  offering  capital
subsidies to new family farmers  of  DM  70,000 annually over  a  period  of  more  than
ten  years.  Despite  its  uniqueness,  the  German  experience  carries  an  important
lesson  for  other  countries.  If  a  country  in  the  CIS  were  to  adopt  a  program  of
assistance  to  agriculture  that  included  guaranteed  wage  security  for  agricultural
workers  at  wages  equal  to  the  national  average,  investment  subsidies  to  assist
enterprises  suffering from  the depreciation  of their capital (albeit more  modest ones
than  in  the  German  case),  and  flexibility  for  enterprise  managers  to  release
redundant workers with only token payments for their shares  in the enterprises,  this
program  would approximate the conditions in East Germany that led to such massive
labor shedding.  Such  a program  or even parts of such a  program should be  adopted
only  if rural  social safety nets  can  be put in  place to cushion  the social  impact.  The
cost  of  social  payments  should  be  considered  in  evaluating  this  approach  to
adjustment  in  comparison  with  other  approaches  leading  to  more  labor-intensive
outcomes.
The  approach  to  valuation and  distribution of farm  assets resulted in  the
concentration of the value of assets in the hands of a relatively small number
of people,  many  of whom  held managerial positions in  the  sector prior to
unification.  The remarkable  increase  in productivity in the sector may derive  in part
from  the concentration  of ownership  and  control  inherent  in  the adjustment  process.
Those  who  left farm  employment  and  sold  their  shares  at  low values  were  in part
compensated  through  eligibility for  the  generous  benefits  of  the  German  social
safety  net,  such  as  unemployment  payments,  pensions,  and  retraining  grants.
Nonetheless,  even  under  German  conditions,  when  unemployment  benefits
exceeded  the  real  wages  of the  socialist era,  the  concentration  of  ownership  that
emerged  through  restructuring has  raised  questions of fairness.  In a country lacking
generous  social  payments,  a comparable  concentration  of ownership  through farm
restructuring would be likely to lead  to rural  poverty and  social unrest.
The  German  government  should  have  provided  more  transparency  and  oversight
during  the  valuation  and  distribution  of  farm  assets.  This  tropic  should  receive
particular  attention  in  countries where  privatization  and  farm  restructuring  are still  in
their early stages.
247Land idled in  eastern Germany  in 1991  significantly  exceeded  the set-aside
area  in the other 11  member  countries of the  EU  combined.  The  CAP  reform
comprised  a  tremendous  financial  gain  for  eastern  German  agriculture  at  a  time
when  large  areas  would  most  likely  have  been  idled  anyway,  even  without  the
payments.  Other countries in line for membership  in the  EU  are  not  likely to face the
same opportunities.  The east German  experience provides  yet another  indication  of
how  fundamentally  the  rules  of  the  CAP  are  likely  to  have  to  change  to
accommodate central  European members  at an acceptable cost.
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249Table  1:  Pattern  of Farms  and  Land Use  in  East Germany
in  1989
Area  Percent Share  Average  Size
(1,000  ha)  of Area  ha
Type of Farm  Number
Collective Farms  3,855  5,343.7  86.4  1,386.2
Crop Production  1,159  5,259.9  85.1  4,538.3
Livestock Production  2,696  83.8  1.3  31.1
State  Farms  465  448.8  7.3  965.2
Crop  Production  79  396.0  6.4  5,012.7
Livestock Production  311  0.0  0.0  0.0
Others  75  0.0  0.0  0.0
Other Socialist  630  34.6  0.5  54.9
Enterprises
Total of Socialist  4,751  5,848.6  94.6  1,231.0
Enterprises
Private Enterprises1  333.1  5.4
Total  6,181.8  100.0
1  This consisted of farm workers'  household production, small  gardens, part-time farms.  500 privately
owned specialized  small farms and farms owned by the church.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of  the DDR, 1989.Table  2: Agricultural Product Prices,  1988  in DM and M/dt respectively
East/West
percent
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Source:  Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR  - Bundesministerium  fur Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft
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CootTable 7: Profit per farm worker for various enterprises in East Germany  in
199293, 1993/94  and  1994/95 (in %)
1992/93  1993/94  1994/95
< 20.000 DM  Profit/Ak
Single Owner  38  30  36
Partnerships  18  12  19
Corporate  Enterprises  18  12  19
For reference:  West Germany  39  36
> 50.000  DM  Profit/AK
Single Owner  33  34  32
Partnerships  65  51  52
Corporate  Enterprises  15  23  33
For reference: West Germany  16
Notes:  Profit /AK includes wages for non-family fanns - The  number of representative  enterprises
differs from year to year due to data problems.  -
For corporate farms the threshhold profit is DM 40 000.
Source: Bundesregierung,  Agrarbericht,  various issues, Materialband,  author's  calculations.
19Figure  1:  Development  of  production  and  employment  in  the  agricultural





a  :  ---  -----  -----  ---------  -----  -----  -----  ---
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Sources:
Statistisches  Bundesamt, Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.3.  1994, several  pages. Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden,
Statistisches  Jahrbuch  1995, page 680 and 681. Jahresgutachten  1995/96 des Sachverstaendigenrates  zur
Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschafthichen  Entwicklung page 376 and 377, Table 25.
Data  for the agricultural  sector are cumulative values because of the seasonal  production  pattern.
Sources for employment:
IVal ues  for agriculture  from 1989: Statistisches  Amt der DDR, Statistisches  Jahrbuch '90, Berlin .p. 215 from
1990.  C. Jannemann,  Die Landwirtschafl im strukturellen  Anpassungsprozess auf  dem Territorium der
ehemaligen DDR  from 1991 to 1994. Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden.Figure  2:  Development  of production and  employment  in  the  industrial sector













Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.3.  1994, several pages.  Statistisches Bundesamnt  Wiesbaden,
Statistisches Jahrbuch 1995 page  680 and 681. Jahresgutachten 1995/96 des Sachverstaendigenrates zur
Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschafthichen  Entwicklung page 376 and 3 77,  Table 25.
alues for construction sector from.  Information of  DlWfrom August/1994.  Index IIl.  Quarter 1989.
['alues for industrial sector from.  Statistisches Bundesamt,  Fachserie 18, Reihe  1.3. Jahresgutachten 1995,196
des Sachverstaendigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamlwirtschafthichen  Entwicklung page 376 and 377, Table
25.
Sources for employment:
I  alues for total employmient and industrial employment.
DIWV-TWochenbericht  4611993.  S. 674.  Berechnungen des Arbeitskreises "Erwerbstatigenrechnung des Bundes
und der Laender " des Statistischen  Bundesamtes: Information of the Bundesanstalt,  fur Arbeit  on 20.  9. 1994
A uthor 's calculations.


















































Legend - sectors  of  economy:
A:  Agriculture, forestry and fishing
F:  Food industry
G:  Government, non-profit private organisations and private households
P:  Processing industries plus mining etc.
S:  Services  plus credit and insurance
T:  Trade and Transport
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Sonderreihe mit Beitraegen  der ehemaligen DDR,
Statistisches  Amt der DDR (ed), Statistisches  Jahrbuch der DDR. Berlin, various  issues.
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29%Share  of Production in Various Sectors of the  FRG  and GDR



























































Legend -Sectors of Economy:
A:  Agriculture, forestry and fishing
F:  Food industry
G:  Government,  non-profit private organizations and private households
P:  Processing  industries plus  mining etc.
S:  Services  plus  credit and insurance
T:  Trade and transport
Source: Statistisches  Amt  der DDR (ed), Statistisches  Jahrbuch  der DDR. Berlin, various issues;
Bundesministerium  fir Ernaehrung,  Landwirtschaft und Forsten (ed.), Statistisches  Jahrbuch  ueber
Ernaehrung,  Landwirtschafl und Forsten. Hamburg!Berlin/Muenster,  various issues.
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Figure  7: Capital I worker (in  1000 DM)  in East and West
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Small = below  40.000  standardised value added'  middle = 40,000 to 60,000  standardised value  added;












0Figure  8: Profit I FAK (in  DM  1000)  in East and West




















Small = below 40.000  standardised value added: middle  = 40.000 to 60,000 standardised value  added:
large = 60.000 to  100.000 standardised value added: very large = 100,000 and more standardised value added










IH,Figure 9:  Milk yield (per cow and  year in kg)  in former GDR and former FRG
from 1985/89 to 1996
5675
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Source: StatistischesAmt der DDR, Statistisches  Jahrbuch der DDR, several issues.
Bundesregierung,  Statistisches  Jahrbuch  fur Erndhrung,  Landwirtschaft und Forsten der BRD,
several issues.
Figure 10: Winter wheat yield  (dt per ha and year)
FRG from 1985 to 1996
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Source: Statistisches  Amt der DDR, Statistisches  Jahrbuch der DDR, several issues.
Bundesregierung,  Statistisches  Jahrbuch  fur Ernahrung,  Landwirtschaft und Forsten der BRD,
several issues.Figure  11:  Potato yield (dt per ha and  year)  in former GDR  and former FRG
from 1985/89 to 1996
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Source: Statistisches  Amt der DDR, Statistisches Jahrbuch  der DDR, several issues.
Bundesregierung, Statistisches  Jahrbuch/fur  Erndhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten der BRD,
several issues.
Figure  12: Sugar  beat yield (dt per ha  and  year)  in former GDR and former FRG
from  1985189 to 1996
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Source: Statistisches  Arnt der DDR, Statistisches  Jahrb  uch der DDR, several issues.
Bundesregierung,  Statistisches  Jahrbuch  far Erndhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten der BRD,
several issues.
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